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I. INTRODUCTION 
Renowned Minnesota construction attorney B.C. Hart 
remarked in 1972 that the government had given birth to a 
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construction method of undefined lineage.1  Ten years later, 
construction management still escaped classification.2  Today, we 
are no closer to its capture. 
Generally, a construction manager (CM) provides clients with 
expert construction advice, ranging from design constructability 
and scheduling to procurement and quality control; but as this 
article explains, conflicting presumptions exist as to what else a CM 
provides.  Failing to decide on the precise use for CM—and the 
resulting wide variance in applying the CM label—frustrates the 
industry.3  Moreover, failing to provide a coherent framework for 
judges and arbitrators creates needless risk and cost.  This article 
first discusses the impact of these failures and concludes that the 
industry benefits from taking a uniform approach to the CM 
delivery method.4  Next, the article explains that striking the CM 
approach in an agency die condenses and anneals the model’s vital 
elements, while expelling the impurities that have seeped in from 
other delivery methods.5
For decades, the CM label has run out of control.6  
Undoubtedly, a single article such as this will have little impact on 
an industry as scattered as construction.  This article, therefore, 
addresses a more practical audience: the advocates and arbiters 
who deal with the CM label daily.  Understanding the economic 
 1. B.C. Hart, Construction Management “CM for Short”: The New Name for an Old 
Game, 8 FORUM 210, 210–11 (1972).  The Public Buildings Service of the General 
Services Administration announced the use of Construction Management on 
March 17, 1970.  Id. at 210. 
 2. Milton F. Lunch, New Construction Methods and New Roles for Engineers, 46 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 83, 83 (1983) (“The one, and probably only, area of 
agreement regarding construction management is that there is no consensus as to 
what it is, what it ought to be, and how it should be applied.”). 
 3. Michael Kenig, vice-chairman of an Atlanta construction firm, voiced 
these concerns in the commentary section of Engineering News-Record: 
  One example [of the lack of a common vocabulary] is the lack of 
consensus on the definition of CM at-risk, also known as CM/GC, CMc, 
GC/CM, etc.  A large number of private owners are using CM at-risk 
without calling it that.  How are we going to start cataloguing lessons 
learned that can be developed into industry-wide best practices if we 
don’t even know what process we’re talking about? 
  If we stay on our current course without common terminology . . . 
[w]e are going to keep doing what we have always done — making the 
same mistakes over and over again. 
Michael Kenig, The Industry Needs Common Language, ENGINEERING NEWS-REC., Feb. 
28, 2005, at 67. 
 4. See infra Part II. 
 5. See infra Part III. 
 6. See supra notes 1–2 and accompanying text. 
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function of CM project delivery provides the knowledge necessary 
to control the CM label, while the underpinnings of agency allow 
turning that understanding into earnings. 
II. THE PROBLEM 
The inability to communicate razed the Tower of Babel, 
civilization’s first great construction project.7  Observing 
humankind’s endless potential as one people with a single tongue,8 
God “confused their language” so they could not understand one 
another.9  Unable to communicate, the builders soon abandoned 
their ambitious project and scattered themselves over the face of 
the earth.10
While confusion over the meaning of construction 
management does not confound with nearly the same magnitude, 
this Old Testament story illustrates a reality affecting both 
construction and the law: far less is possible without a common 
understanding amongst participants. 
A. Risky Business 
Earning a profit in construction requires digging for pennies 
in a minefield.  The headwaters of this risky business first gather 
around its lack of vertical integration.  Construction can hardly 
boast one-stop shopping.  Not only does the Owner traditionally 
buy a design and a building from two different sources, but the 
parties themselves extend hopelessly outward in order to meet 
their contractual obligations.11  The magic of raising a glass and 
brick laboratory, for example, from the raw elements of cement 
dust, iron ore, clay, and sand requires endless horizontal contracts 
with specialty designers, tiers of subcontractors, and chains of 
manufacturers, suppliers, and distributors. 
To make matters worse, many people are in the minefield 
looking for the same pennies.  For instance, construction had six 
 7. See Genesis 11 (New Revised Standard Version). 
 8. Id. at 11:6 (“And the Lord said, ‘Look, they are one people, and they have 
all one language; and this is only the beginning of what they will do; nothing that 
they propose to do will now be impossible for them.’”). 
 9. See id. at 11:7 (“Come, let us go down, and confuse their language there, 
so that they will not understand one another’s speech.”). 
 10. See id. at 11:8. 
 11. See JEREMIAH D. LAMBERT & LAWRENCE WHITE, HANDBOOK OF MODERN 
CONSTRUCTION LAW 100–10 (1982). 
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times as many suppliers sharing the same dollar in 2002 as 
wholesale trade, the single largest sector of the U.S. economy.12  As 
the economy’s sixth largest sector, construction shared $1.2 trillion 
with 710,000 suppliers.  By comparison, wholesale trade shared 
nearly four times that amount amongst a far fewer 440,000 
suppliers.13  Moreover, these construction suppliers are mostly 
small, undercapitalized, and financially unstable.14  Thus, the 
extent of this fracturing, coupled with low-entry barriers, translates 
into expanded risk and high competition.15  Razor-thin margins 
result, leaving only pennies for contractors. 
For construction’s customers, the inescapable reality is that 
building is a means to an end.16  In meeting this end, poor timing 
has always plagued the industry.  As early as the 1930s, for example, 
economists in Chicago found that by the time construction caught 
up with demand for office space, the demand had already begun to 
wane.17  Naturally, this led to an oversupply in the market and 
falling rents.18  This illustrates how construction’s transaction costs, 
due in this case to long lead times, keep a constant pressure on 
demand. 
Transaction costs also arise from the uncertain nature of 
construction itself.19  This inherent uncertainty compounds the 
 12. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 2002 ECONOMIC CENSUS tbl.1 (2002), 
http://www.census.gov/prod/ec02/ec0200ccomp. 
pdf.  Wholesale trade generated $4.6 trillion using 440,000 suppliers, or 95,000 
suppliers for every $1 trillion generated; compare this to construction’s crowded 
590,000 suppliers for each $1 trillion generated.  See id.  Thought of another way, 
the average wholesale trade participant supplies $10.5 million to the sector, while 
the average construction participant supplies only $1.7 million.  See id. 
 13. Id. 
 14. See LAMBERT & WHITE, supra note 11, at 193. 
 15. An index of publicly traded companies in the General Contractor 
industry reveals a net profit margin of 3.2%, compared to 6.2% for the entire 
Industrial Goods sector.  See Yahoo! Finance General Contractors Page, 
http://biz.yahoo.com/p/636qpmu.html (last visited Oct. 25, 2007). 
 16. It is axiomatic that no public or private interest will build for the sake of 
building.  Therefore, an Owner’s ultimate interest when contracting with builders 
is the deliverable due at the end of the project.  See Richard D. Conner, Contracting 
for Construction Management Services, 46 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 6–8 (1983). 
 17. See The Skyscraper Boom: Better than Flying, ECONOMIST, June 3–9, 2006, at 
67. 
 18. Id. 
 19. This proposition has been supported ad nauseam by quoting Blake 
Construction Co. v. C.J. Coakley Co., 431 A.2d 569, 575 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (“Even the 
most painstaking planning frequently turns out to be mere conjecture and 
accommodation to changes must necessarily be of the rough, quick and ad hoc 
sort, analogous to ever-changing commands on the battlefield.”).  See, e.g., John D. 
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diminishing profit margin problem and adds a layer of risk that is 
unattractive to many investors.20  Thus, it is no surprise that the 
largest U.S. corporation earns in one quarter what the largest U.S. 
contractor sells in an entire year.21
It is important to understand that risk lies at the heart of all 
construction.22  The construction industry sweeps across a 
financially diverse group of owners, contractors, and designers,23 
creating unique risk and a unique means of governing and 
allocating that risk.24  Thus, a necessary allocative and distributive 
purpose for construction exists: to place risk with those who can 
control it, transfer it, and maximize the cost-benefit of bearing it.25  
The contractor, in particular, is uniquely positioned to affect this 
process.26
B. Finding the Pennies 
Our built environment results from combining three 
fundamental elements: customers, designers, and builders.27  
Darling, Delay of Game, 26 CONSTRUCTION LAW. 5, 5 (2006); Michael R. Finke, 
Claims for Construction Productivity Losses, 26 PUB. CONT. L.J. 311, 315 n.17 (1997). 
 20. See 2 PHILIP L. BRUNER & PATRICK J. O’CONNOR JR., BRUNER & O’CONNOR 
ON CONSTRUCTION LAW § 7:10 n.1 (2002) (“This competitive environment, coupled 
with the inherent uncertainty of the construction process, partially explains why 
construction companies rarely find favor on Wall Street or with non-management 
investors.”). 
 21. Exxon Mobile sat atop the Fortune 500 in 2006, reporting a before-tax 
profit of $18.2 billion for the third quarter of the 2006–2007 fiscal year.  Fortune 
500 Largest U.S. Corporations, FORTUNE, Apr. 17, 2006, at F-1; Exxon Mobile Corp.’s 
Income Statement, http://finance.yahoo.com/q/is?s=XOM (last visited Oct. 25, 
2007).  By comparison, the Bechtel Group, Engineering News-Record’s top U.S. 
contractor had sales of $20.5 billion for all of 2006 based on 2005 revenue, Gary J. 
Tulacz, The Top 400 Contractors, ENGINEERING NEWS-REC, May 22, 2006, at 60; 
BECHTEL, BECHTEL REPORT 3 (2007), http://www.bechtel.com/AnnualReport/ 
2007Report.pdf. 
 22. See 2 BRUNER & O’CONNOR, supra note 20, § 7:10. 
 23. Id. § 7:179. 
 24. See id. §§ 7:17–:18. 
 25. Id. § 7:10 (quoting Max Abrahamson, Risk Management, 2 INT’L CONST. L. 
REV. 241, 244 (1984)). 
 26. See Carl J. Circo, Contract Theory and Contract Practice: Allocating Design 
Responsibility in the Construction Industry, 58 FLA. L. REV. 561, 601 (July 2006) 
[hereinafter Contract Theory].  “Building contractors specialize in managing 
construction risks . . . .  By trade and experience, they are well-equipped to 
evaluate those risks and to establish fees based on the nature and extent of the 
construction risks they assume by contract.”  Id. 
 27. See 2 BRUNER & O’CONNOR, supra note 20, § 6:1.  Even the CM delivery 
system discussed throughout this article does not add an additional element to the 
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Traditionally, these elements are cast in three distinct characters.  
The customer element, represented generically by “the Owner,” is 
central to all construction.28  Under a traditional framework, the 
Owner gathers the remaining elements under two separate 
contracts, forming the compartmentalized tripartite arrangement 
of traditional construction delivery.29
Over time, these elements have mixed together in countless 
ways30 to efficiently allocate and spread the risks inherent in 
pushing back rivers, scratching roads through wilderness, and 
raising skyscrapers from marshes.31  In the process, the 
compartmentalization of the tripartite system has dissolved as 
markets find more efficient formulations for transferring risk.32  As 
this continues to occur, the three primary elements further blend 
into various hues and reallocate themselves amongst hybrid 
parties.33
Construction management is an example of this market 
influence.  Construction management emerged from “the 
perceived weaknesses and inefficiencies” of the traditional tripartite 
construction process.  See id. § 6:57.  Instead, the CM absorbs some of the 
designing and building tasks traditionally carried out by architects and general 
contractors, respectively.  Id.  The same is also true for design-build delivery: 
although an owner contracts design duties to the builder, the builder will still have 
to tap a designer, either through subcontract or direct employment, to develop 
construction documents that achieve the Owner’s objectives.  See id. § 6:15. 
 28. See id. 
 29. See Contract Theory, supra note 26, at 565 (describing the design-bid-build 
process and the Owner’s separate contracts with the architect and builder). 
 30. See Carl J. Circo, When Specialty Designs Cause Building Disasters: 
Responsibility for Shared Architectural and Engineering Services, 84 NEB. L. REV. 162, 168 
(2005) [hereinafter Specialty Designs].  “Only feasibility and imagination limit the 
possible variations in project delivery systems.”  Id. 
 31. See generally 2 BRUNER & O’CONNOR, supra note 20, §§ 7:1–:14 (discussing 
the allocative and distributive principles for construction risk). 
 32. See, e.g., Specialty Designs, supra note 30, at 206–07 (discussing the need to 
re-allocate specialty design risk to subcontractors because the architect is not best 
suited to bear such design responsibility). 
 33. See Hart, supra note 1, at 218 (presenting a prominent American 
architect’s view of CM delivery as an intermediate stop on the way to permanently 
dissolving the conflict-boundaries separating builder, Owner, and architect).  
Compare Gary J. Tulacz, The Top 100: Owners Demand Broader Services, ENGINEERING 
NEWS-REC., June 13, 2005, at 28 (describing the lack of standardization fueling an 
ever expanding hybridization of delivery models and the need to define the nature 
of construction management), with Conner, supra note 16, at 5 (“The catalyst for 
[construction management] has been the owner’s determination to force the 
construction industry to regard a highly fragmented series of discrete decisions 
and events as a single process.”) (quoting Edward W. Davis & Lindsay White, How 
to Avoid Construction Headaches, HARV. BUS. REV., Mar.-Apr. 1973, at 87, 93). 
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approach.34  These weaknesses became apparent with technological 
developments in the industry,35 the demand for greater control 
over project costs and schedules,36 and design professionals seeking 
to avoid their traditional liability as master builder.37  Extremely 
high interest rates and inflation in the 1970s added to the 
dissatisfaction and led owners to search for ways to speed up the 
construction process.38  Fast-track construction, along with multi-
prime contracting and construction management, emerged from 
this crucible.39  Construction management was developed to serve 
as the Owner’s jungle guide in an intense building environment.40  
Indeed, a close reading of B.C. Hart’s 1972 article reveals processes 
that later grew into fast-track and design-build.41  Further, the 
bouncing baby Hart spoke of was more accurately the construction 
management blanket wrapped around these nascent fraternal 
twins.42
A major problem with the original construction management 
model was that while CMs were experts at forecasting and 
managing costs, they never provided a means of guaranteeing those 
costs to the Owner.43  The Owner found this problematic because it 
 34. JUSTIN SWEET, LEGAL ASPECTS OF ARCHITECTURE, ENGINEERING, AND THE 
CONSTRUCTION PROCESS 451 (3d ed. 1985). 
 35. See Specialty Designs, supra note 30, at 206. 
 36. Id. 
 37. See Note, Architectural Malpractice: A Contract-Based Approach, 92 HARV. L. 
REV. 1075, 1080 (1979). 
 38. See DANIEL S. HAPKE, JR., DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS: 
REPRESENTING THE OWNER 55 (1987). 
 39. Id. 
 40. See Hart, supra note 1, at 219.  “What has changed . . . is the role of the 
owner.  The construction manager is the Owner’s tool, invented by the owner out 
of his own need and in one sense a kind of makeshift device invented to fill the 
obvious gaps in the construction process.”  Id. (quotation omitted). 
 41. See id. at 218–19. 
 42. Id.  A current example of this nepotism between design-build, fast-track, 
and CM is the I-35W bridge rebuild project.  To achieve a safe—but expedient—
rebuild of the bridge, the Minnesota Department of Transportation (Mn/DOT) 
announced plans for a design-build delivery.  See Mn/DOT, I35W Bridge 
Replacement – Rebuild Plans, http://www.dot.state.mn.us/i35wbridge/rebuild/ 
pdfs/bridge-replacement-overview.pdf (last visited Oct. 22, 2007).  Nevertheless, in 
what little information that is available about the upcoming project, Mn/DOT 
describes benefits that could just as easily be classified as fast-track.  For example, 
the agency lists overlapping design and construction activities as a design-build 
benefit, even though this is also achieved through fast-track construction without 
single-sourcing design and construction.  See infra text accompanying notes 113, 
117. 
 43. See id. at 220. 
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needed to forecast cash flows and secure lending.44  But because 
the CM approach had always been about serving the Owner,45 the 
CM-at-risk was soon created to provide the Owner the Guaranteed 
Maximum Price,46 or GMP, feature it desired.47
C. Protecting the Pennies 
A severe side effect results from allowing market forces to 
shape the construction delivery process.  By leaving the 
classification of these market evolutions to superficial and irregular 
criteria, the industry provides courts with a confusing mix of 
contradictory definitions and non sequiturs, in addition to the 
already complicated process of deciding construction cases.48  As 
explained below, no standard definition for CM-at-risk or GC/CM 
exists, nor does clarity as to how these processes differ from a 
typical general contractor (GC) managing fast-track construction. 
For example, an industry-standard CM-for-fee form contract 
does not expressly provide for the agency relationship typically 
intended between the Owner and CM.49  At the same time, other 
form contracts allowing the CM to participate in construction do 
not expressly disclaim the agency relationship.50  Thus, courts and 
arbitrators are left to read between the lines of the contract, 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. at 219. 
 46. GMP is defined as: 
a) A fee arrangement between the client and the architect whereby the   
 total remuneration payable to the architect for services rendered is  
restricted to a pre-agreed maximum. 
 b) A fee arrangement between the client and the contractor whereby 
the total amount payable to the contractor for the construction of the 
project is restricted to a pre-agreed maximum.   
FREEMANWHITE, DESIGN & CONSTRUCTION LIST OF TERMS 3, 
http://www.ordesignandconstruction.com/Glossary%20FreemanWhite0804.pdf. 
 47. See Conner, supra note 16, at 9. 
 48. See 1 BRUNER & O’CONNOR, supra note 20, § 1:2 (“[C]omplexities in 
construction have created difficulties for some judges and many juries in gaining 
sufficient understanding of the factual basis of construction disputes to fairly 
decide the issues . . . .”). 
 49. See AM. INST. OF ARCHITECTS, AIA DOCUMENT A201 (1997), available at 
http://www.engin.umich.edu/class/cee431/AIA/05.04.05_A201_SAMPLE_encry
pted.pdf . 
 50. See AM. INST. OF ARCHITECTS, AIA DOCUMENT A121 CMC / AGC DOCUMENT 
565 (2003), available at http://www.ci.durham.nc.us/agendas/2007/cm20070116/ 
80718_3692_111708.pdf; AM. INST. OF ARCHITECTS, AIA DOCUMENT A131 CMC / 
AGC DOCUMENT 566  (2003). 
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reflecting on the parties’ interactions and taking cues from an 
industry, which only provides further confusion.51
Litigating over risk allocation in construction contracts alone is 
expensive.52  Adding an ill-defined relationship between the parties 
only exacerbates this transaction cost.53  Moreover, repeatedly using 
the single term “construction manager” in widely-varying contracts 
poses interpretation problems for courts and arbitrators.  It creates 
the perception that all contracts intend the same relationship, and 
it increases the likelihood that courts will apply some 
misunderstood standard far different from what the parties would 
have selected ex ante.54
This danger, however, also reveals an opportunity.  Judges and 
arbitrators are most efficient when they can resolve contract 
disputes using commercial and economic common sense without 
the need to take evidence.55  To this end, the more a judge or 
arbitrator knows about the economic function of the contract, the 
greater the likelihood of an efficient result.56  Thus, the market 
benefits by providing the judge or arbitrator with a cohesive idea of 
the CM’s purpose and the economic advantages the CM provides to 
construction. 
1. Allocating Tort Liability 
An advantage also exists with regard to tort liability.  A builder 
is often drawn into tort litigation through Restatement (Second) of 
Torts section 414.57  In Kelley v. Howard S. Wright Construction Co., for 
instance, the Supreme Court of Washington recognized the GC’s 
 51. See Walter F. Pratt, Jr., Afterword: Contracts and Uncertainty, LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS., Winter 1983, 169, 171 (“If the language of the contract cannot be made 
certain . . . then courts can turn only to the conduct of the parties or to the habits 
of the industry for guidance in construing the language.”). 
 52. See Center for Public Resources, Preventing and Resolving Construction 
Disputes, 9 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 182, 183 (1991). 
 53. See Pratt, supra note 51, at 171 (“If neither the parties nor the industry 
have developed useful patterns, then the courts will be left without any standard, 
and litigation will produce only further uncertainty.”). 
 54. See id. at 171–72.  (“Although the result might be that the ‘contract’ is 
enforced, the norms might be very different from the ones that the parties 
themselves would have chosen.”). 
 55. Richard A. Posner, The Law and Economics of Contract Interpretation, 83 TEX. 
L. REV. 1581, 1605 (2005). 
 56. Id.  The efficiency results from a lower cost in maximizing the joint 
surplus of the contract, ex ante.  Id. at 1591. 
 57. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 414 (1965). 
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authority to influence and control the entire jobsite,58 and 
subsequently found the GC owed a general duty of care to the 
subcontractors’ employees.59  The Kelley court based its decision on 
section 414’s requirement to provide a safe workplace where the 
GC retains control of some part of the work.60
On the other hand, comment c to section 414 requires that 
the contractee retain “at least some degree of control over the 
manner in which the work is done.”61  And, as comment c points 
out, no duty exists where the contractee retains only the general 
right “to order the work stopped or resumed, to inspect its progress 
or to receive reports, to make suggestions or recommendations . . . 
or to prescribe alterations and deviations.”62  The Supreme Court of 
Washington used this comment in Kamla v. Space Needle Corp. as the 
basis for circumscribing a contractee’s liability for injuries to the 
contractor’s employee.63  In a similar case, Hennig v. Crosby Group, 
Inc., the court held that the Owner’s right to inspect work was not 
sufficient to create a duty to its subcontractor’s employees.64
Notwithstanding an arrangement similar to Kamla or Hennig 
where the CM only manages contract performance, courts will 
likely make the same assumption as they did in Kelley.  Thus, if the 
industry cannot show a clear delineation between a CM’s duties 
and a GC’s duties, then CMs will continue to be treated as GCs.  
Thus, the message must be clear: the general liability appropriate 
for a GC’s building enterprise is inconsistent with a CM’s decidedly 
non-entrepreneurial service to the Owner.  CMs fit into the 
exceptions of section 414;65 their toolboxes are cluttered with 
contract clauses and deviation notices, not blowtorches and 
jackhammers.  At their most efficient, CMs retain only the right to 
stop or order correction of work not complying with the contract.66  
 58. 582 P.2d 500, 505–06 (Wash. 1978). 
 59. Id. at 506.  Minnesota courts have not rigidly applied section 414 to 
general contractors in the same way as Washington courts.  Yet, Minnesota has 
generally recognized that contractees can be liable where they retain “some 
measure of control over the project.”  Conover v. N. States Power Co., 313 N.W.2d 
397, 401 (Minn. 1981). 
 60. Kelly, 582 P.2d at 505; accord RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 414 cmt. b 
(1965). 
 61. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 414 cmt. c (1965). 
 62. Id. 
 63. 52 P.3d 472, 475–76 (Wash. 2002). 
 64. 802 P.2d 790, 792 (Wash. 1991). 
 65. See supra notes 61–62 and accompanying text. 
 66. Alan B. Stover, Construction and Design Contracts, in CONSTRUCTION LAW § 
10
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Narrowing courts’ expectations of control will bring the CM’s legal 
duty in line with its limited, negative control over subcontractors.  
Over time, this may help reduce inefficiencies caused by insurance 
over-coverage and paying subcontractors to indemnify activity 
outside the CM’s scope of liability. 
2. Encouraging Safety 
Moving construction management away from Kelley encourages 
CMs to participate in their projects, rather than sit in their trailers, 
paralyzed by the fear of limitless liability.  Safety is paramount on 
any jobsite, but holding CMs accountable because they observed an 
unsafe practice will only cause CMs to pluck out their eyes. 
For example, in Thill v. Modern Erecting Co., the Supreme Court 
of Minnesota found direct liability under section 414 where the GC 
actually observed the work that ultimately injured the plaintiff.67  
The court later sharpened this holding in Larsen v. Minneapolis Gas 
Co., finding a GC’s failure to observe the negligent work resulted 
only in vicarious liability.68  Accordingly, where indemnification was 
applicable and the tortfeasor-subcontractor remained solvent, the 
unseeing GC was absolved of any responsibility to the plaintiff.69
This see-no-evil approach chills proactive, safety-conscious 
activity.  Instead, the CMs should be encouraged to provide a peer 
review of their subcontractors’ safety practices, to stop work when 
those practices are deemed insufficient or back charge the 
contractor for making them sufficient, and to augment the 
contractors’ safety efforts as the CM chooses.  To encourage 
development of this extra layer of safety, the sole responsibility for 
safety must fall on the contractor and any action by the CM is an 
added bonus. 
While this same rationale could be applied to workers’ 
compensation insurance, lobbying for such reform is beyond the 
scope of this article.  It is, however, sufficient to say that clearer CM 
liability allows greater consistency in how construction 
management delivery is used.  In addition, as the liabilities become 
clearer, the CM model becomes more precise at spreading risk and 
fewer transaction costs exist to dissuade use of the model. 
3.08(1)(b) (Steven G.M. Stein ed., 2007). 
 67. 272 Minn. 217, 226, 136 N.W.2d 677, 684 (1965). 
 68. 282 Minn. 135, 143–44, 163 N.W.2d 755, 761–62 (1968). 
 69. 282 Minn. 135, 148, 163 N.W.2d 755, 764 (1968). 
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III. THE AGENCY MANIFESTO 
In construction management’s first decade, risk-bearing was 
not determinative of agency vel non.  In fact, the position endorsed 
in this article was once the accepted form of construction 
management.70  Perhaps the separate agency-CM and CM-at-risk 
labels created an either/or perception: either the CM was an agent 
under the first label or the “at risk” tag attached to the second 
label, which implied something outside of fiduciary relationships. 71  
Of course, this perception is wrong.  Basing a CM’s compensation 
on performance measures, such as meeting a GMP, does not 
destroy the agency relationship.72  Nevertheless, distinguishing 
between a CM’s purely advisory role and its use to distribute risk is 
helpful in subcategorizing CM delivery.  Thus, such distinctions 
should return to their original purpose, which is to define the CM’s 
fee arrangement. 
A. Agency vel non 
Creating an agency relationship requires a manifestation of 
assent between an agent and a principal that the agent will perform 
 70. See Note, supra note 37, at 1080 (describing the CM’s role as providing the 
Owner technical and business advice; budgeting, scheduling and procuring 
contractor work; and coordinating, inspecting, and overseeing contractor work to 
insure its conformity with the construction documents). 
 71. The industry ultimately bifurcated the CM model so that anything not 
fitting neatly into the “pure” CM model of flat fee and professional services akin to 
an architect was swept into “CM-at-risk.”  See Conner, supra note 16, at 8.  At the 
same time, the “pure” model became known as “agency-CM” because of its unique 
and readily identifiable agency relationship with the Owner.  See John I. Spangler 
& William H. Hill, The Evolving Liabilities of Construction Managers, CONSTRUCTION 
LAW., Jan. 1999, at 30.  To avoid any implication, however, that some CM deliveries 
may not involve an agency relationship, this Article embraces the industry moniker 
for agency-CM, “CM-for-fee.”  See Gary J. Tulacz, Top 100 CM-for-Fee Firms, 
ENGINEERING NEWS-REC., June 12, 2006, at 40 (using the “CM-for-fee” designation 
to account for sales from agent-CM services). 
 72. In addition to the arguments presented later in this Article, both courts 
and the Restatements address this issue.  In IPSCO Steel, Inc. v. Blaine Construction 
Corp., for instance, a CM under a GMP contract was required to reimburse its 
principal for construction costs exceeding $182 million.  371 F.3d 141, 144 (3d 
Cir. 2004).  During subsequent settlement of a subcontractor default, the court of 
appeals required that the CM act in the best interest of its principal, even if that 
meant exposing itself to a greater penalty under the GMP arrangement.  Id. at 
148–49.  See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.01 cmt. b (2006) (allowing 
the principal to “structure the basis on which an agent will be compensated so that 
the agent’s interests are concurrent with those of the principal”). 
12
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for the principal’s benefit and subject to the principal’s control.73  
Industry commentators, however, have used irrelevant criteria to 
expel CM-at-risk from the sphere of agency.  For instance, instead 
of simply applying the criteria above, one commentator arrived at a 
CM-for-fee relationship by reasoning that the Owner accepts risk of 
delay, poor performance, and unexpected cost.  Thus, the CM 
must be merely an agent.74
The placement of risk, however, is clearly not a criterion for 
the agency–principal relationship.  For example, an attorney 
engaging clients on a lump sum basis accepts pricing-risk without 
compromising the agency relationship.  The attorney manifested 
consent to act under the control of the client.75  In addition, the 
attorney consented to work for the client’s benefit, not the 
attorney’s benefit. 
Commentators also believe that because a CM holds trade or 
supplier contracts, the CM is not an agent.76  Additionally, these 
commentators find that guaranteeing the price of a project 
through a GMP77 places the CM “at risk.”78  Hence, such CM 
arrangements cannot overlay an agency relationship with the 
Owner.79  No agency criterion exists, however, to support either 
conclusion. 
1. Contracting Directly with Subcontractors 
With regard to the CM entering into contracts, the issue is not 
as simple as the CM contracting with a subcontractor.  The issue is 
 73. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01. 
 74. See Stover, supra note 66, § 3.08(1)(b). 
 75. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) (2006).  Indeed, the 
professional norms of the attorney-client relationship provide the attorney implied 
authority in carrying out the attorney’s work, without disqualifying an agency 
relationship.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 16 
(2000). 
 76. See 2 BRUNER & O’CONNOR, supra note 20, § 6:13; Stover, supra note 66, § 
3.08(1)(b); SWEET, supra note 34, at 385-86; Spangler & Hill, supra note 71, at 30. 
 77. See 2 BRUNER & O’CONNOR, supra note 20, § 6:82.  Under a GMP, the 
builder assumes the risk of the costs exceeding a maximum price.  Id. 
 78. See id.  Bruner and O’Connor, however, find that holding subcontracts is 
all that is necessary to remove the CM from the agency approach.  See id. § 6:13.  
Significantly, commentators ignore perhaps the most efficient version of CM: 
serving at the Owner’s pleasure and for the Owner’s benefit; providing expert 
advice; spreading risk; entering into contracts at the Owner’s discretion; managing 
contracts; and doing so without an opportunity for entrepreneurial profits.  
Bruner and O’Connor refer to this as a brokerage arrangement.  See id. § 15:19. 
 79. See id. § 6.59. 
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whether the CM is acting for the benefit of the Owner.  Agents 
regularly bind principals through third-party contracts.80  Agents 
can become a party to the contract by guaranteeing the principal’s 
performance81 or entering into a contract that excludes the 
principal altogether.82  Industry customs, such as the lawyer 
assuming primary liability for debts incurred in the course of 
serving a client, may also make the agent primarily liable.83  
Additionally, federal statute can reverse the default rule and 
require express language to bind the government principal.84  
While this certainly puts the agent “at risk,” the agency relationship 
remains so long as the agent acts on behalf of the principal. 
Mistaken confusion over “at risk” may also stem from assuming 
parity between GCs and CMs contracting with subcontractors.  
When a GC contracts with a subcontractor to perform an 
obligation under the GC’s contract with the Owner, the GC is at 
risk for that performance, regardless of what happens to the 
subcontractor.85  Moreover, the Owner has no recourse against the 
subcontractor for non-performance.86  When CMs contract for the 
 80. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 6.01 (2006). 
 81. See id. § 6.01 cmt. d.  Where an agent acts with actual or apparent 
authority and enters into a contract with a third-party, the agent and third-party 
can agree the agent will be a party to the contract.  Id. 
 82. Id. cmt. b (reasoning that a third-party does not “manifest assent to an 
exchange with the principal” where an agent, acting on behalf of the principal, 
enters into a contract excluding the principal as a party, and thus, the principal is 
not a party to the contract).  It is important to note, however, that this does not 
abrogate the principal’s duty to indemnify the agent for contracts entered into on 
the principal’s behalf.  See id. cmt. d.  Thus, while the third-party may only have a 
cause of action against the agent, the principal is not excused from the litigation.  
Id. 
 83. Id. cmt. d (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 
30(2)(b)).  The rationale behind this rule is that industry custom indicates that 
the third-party relies on the lawyer’s creditworthiness, not the client’s.  Id. 
 84. United Bonding Ins. Co. v. Catalytic Constr. Co., 533 F.2d 469, 473–74 
(9th Cir. 1976) (Kennedy, Circuit Judge) (finding the Assignment of Claims Act 
requires the United States contract in its own name in order to receive protection 
under the act). 
 85. 9 ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 779D (interim ed. 2002).  
But see E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 10.4 (3d. ed. 2004) 
(discussing the modern trend in some courts to allow actions between 
subcontractors and between the Owner and subcontractor under an intended 
beneficiary analysis; noting that this analysis is particularly prevalent in multi-
prime contracting, which CM arrangements often mimic). 
 86. CORBIN, supra note 85, § 779D (reasoning that because “[t]he [O]wner is 
neither a creditor beneficiary nor a donee beneficiary,” the Owner “has no right 
against the subcontractor, in the absence of clear words to the contrary”). 
14
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benefit of the disclosed Owner, however, CMs do not guarantee the 
performance of the subcontractor.87  Instead, the agents are only 
liable if they entered into the contract without authority88 or if by 
entering into the contract, they breached their duty of care, 
competence, and diligence.89  Accordingly, the Owner’s primary 
recourse is against the subcontractor.90
2. Guaranteed Maximum Price 
With regard to GMP, commentators need look no further than 
the attorney-client relationship for an example of pricing risk not 
affecting agency status.  The attorney–client relationship is the 
quintessential agency relationship.91  Lump sum fees and 
contingency arrangements, however, are readily allowed.92  In both 
cases, the attorney’s fee is at risk, and, in both cases, the attorney 
remains the client’s agent. 
A CM operating under a GMP is no different.  The so-called 
CM-at-risk will not earn its fee if the project is not completed within 
the guaranteed price.93  But like the attorney assuming the risk 
under a fixed cost or contingency arrangement, the CM can still 
continue to act on behalf of the Owner and subject to the Owner’s 
control.  Thus, CM-at-risk remains an agency relationship. 
 87. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 6.01 (2006).  This can be modified, 
however, by agreement with the third-party.  Id. cmt. b (“An agent who enters into 
a contract on behalf of a disclosed principal does not become a party to the 
contract and is not subject to liability as a guarantor of the principal’s 
performance unless the agent and the third party so agree.”).  The Owner and CM 
can also modify the CM’s liability through contract.  See id. cmt. d. 
 88. “An agent has a duty to take action only within the scope of the agent’s 
actual authority.”  Id. § 8.09(1).  But even if the CM did not have actual authority 
from the Owner, if the Owner manifested apparent authority to the third-party, 
the Owner and third-party are joined in contract, and the CM must indemnify the 
Owner.  See id. § 6.01 cmt. b. 
 89. Id. § 8.08.  Additional duties can also be created through the Owner–CM 
contract.  See id. § 8.07. 
 90. See id. § 6.01. 
 91. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS ch.2, topic 1, 
introductory note (2000) (“A fundamental distinction is involved between clients, 
to whom lawyers owe many duties, and nonclients, to whom lawyers owe few 
duties”); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS §§ 14–16 
(providing the attorney-client analog to forming an agency relationship and the 
duties that relationship imputes). 
 92. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.5(a), (c) (2006). 
 93. See, e.g., IPSCO Steel, Inc. v. Blaine Constr. Corp., 371 F.3d 141, 148–49 
(3d Cir. 2004) (requiring CM to effectuate a settlement in the Owner’s interest at 
the expense of the CM’s own profitability). 
15
Berger: Drawing the Line: A Proposal For Limiting the Form and Function o
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2007
5. BERGER - ADC.DOC 12/15/2007  3:01:13 PM 
168 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:1 
 
An argument may exist that attorneys under a fixed fee 
proposal guarantee a proportionally smaller amount of risk under 
their direct control and expertise.  Conversely, the CM is asked to 
guarantee staggering risks largely outside the CM’s control.  Thus, 
the disproportionate risk precludes such an attorney–client analogy 
from justifying a CM’s ability to act as the Owner’s fiduciary under 
a GMP arrangement.  This argument not only ignores agency 
formation and function,94 it also reveals misconceptions about how 
the CM assembles the GMP.  Moreover, such reasoning obstructs 
the Owner from the greater protection afforded by the agency 
relationship. 
The practical reality of GMP pricing is that the contractor 
rarely assumes any more risk than the attorney who commits to a 
fee ex ante.95  The less that is known about the costs or final design 
of the building, the more protective the GMP will be of the 
contractor.96  Further, the GMP is not set in stone.  The contractor 
can justify an upward adjustment based on typical change order 
arguments97 or it can rig the GMP with so many qualifications that 
nearly any reasonable argument would justify an increase.98  In 
essence, the GMP is not a reasonable substitute for fixed-price 
contracting.99  Rather, the risk of exceeding the GMP is so low that 
 94. It neither pays regard to the agent’s assent to work for the Owner’s 
benefit nor his assent to work under its control.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
AGENCY § 1.01 (2006).  Moreover, this argument wholly ignores the agent’s ability 
to guarantee performance and distribute risk.  See, e.g., id. § 6.01 cmt. d (discussing 
the agent’s ability to guarantee contract performance), see, e.g., id. § 8.07 (allowing 
the principle to require the agent to carry insurance and utilize indemnity 
provisions in its subcontract arrangements).  See also IPSCO Steel, 371 F.3d at 144 
(recognizing CM retained agency relationship despite entering into subcontracts 
and being responsible for cost overruns); Sanborn v. Kelly, 618 N.Y.S.2d 146, 148 
(N.Y. App. Div. 1994) (recognizing CM retained agency relationship despite duty 
to insure Owner against loss). 
 95. See Stover, supra note 66, § 3.08(1)(b) (“In effect, the contractor/CM has 
little at risk unless it has offered a [GMP] in advance of obtaining bids from the 
specialty trade contractors.”). 
 96. See Gary J. Tulacz, More Public Agencies Look to CM to Protect Against Risk in 
Hot Market: But Who Is Really ‘At Risk’ from Price Changes in CM-at-Risk?, ENGINEERING 
NEWS-REC., June 12, 2006, at 42. 
 97. See Stover, supra note 66, § 3.08(1)(b) (“[T]he [GMP] is subject to 
upward adjustment for any of the reasons that a contractor working on the basis of 
a stipulated sum would be entitled to a change order increasing the contract 
price.”). 
 98. See Tulacz, supra note 96, at 42 (discussing CMs’ use of contract 
assumption narratives and increased contingencies to insulate themselves from 
GMP risk). 
 99. Under a fixed price contract, the contractor is not excused or “entitled to 
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the GMP functions more like a cost plus fixed-fee arrangement.100
Furthermore, if an arms-length contract implicates the Owner-
contractor relationship, the Owner’s only protection from abuse is 
an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.101  But, if 
agency duties are properly recognized as inuring to the CM-at-risk, 
then the Owner is further protected from self-dealing because the 
CM is held to the selfless standards of a fiduciary.102  Therefore, as 
hard dollar subcontracts begin crystallizing the once-budgetary 
GMP, the Owner receives the same pricing guarantees that it would 
receive under a GC arrangement.  The only difference is that the 
guarantee arises from a broader aggregate of risk-diverse contracts 
because the CM is not performing any of the work.  Most 
importantly, the Owner’s interests remain primary, meaning the 
Owner has an additional layer of assurance that the GMP buyout 
must proceed solely for the Owner’s benefit, an assurance not 
provided when an arms-length GC oversees the GMP. 
3. Self-Performing Work 
Finally, some commentators describe CM-at-risk as a delivery in 
which the CM ultimately uses its own construction forces.103  This is 
not so alarming in respect to agency because the contractor—in 
additional compensation” unless the Owner breaches an implied warranty of 
adequate design.  See United States v. Spearin, 248 U.S. 132, 136 (1918). 
 100. Cost plus fixed-fee (CPFF) reimburses the contractor for costs and pays a 
fixed-fee typically based on a percentage of the estimated construction costs.  See 
STUART H. BARTHOLOMEW, CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTING: BUSINESS AND LEGAL 
PRINCIPLES 32 (1998).  GMP uses the same format, except that the estimated 
construction cost represents the Owner’s maximum liability, with the contractor 
agreeing to cover any overages.  Id. at 33.  Of course, if the maximum construction 
cost is not set at a competitive price for the work, and arms-length transactions 
provide little duty to set this competitive price, the GMP functions no differently 
than a CPFF arrangement. 
 101. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1981) (“Every contract 
imposes upon each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its performance 
and its enforcement.”). 
 102. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY §§ 8.01–.11 (2006) (holding an agent 
liable to the principal for breaching fiduciary duties of loyalty, including self-
dealing, disclosure, care, acting within authority, providing information, and 
obeying instructions).  It should be noted, however, that contract and custom can 
modify these duties.  See id. § 8.01 cmt. b. 
 103. See Stover, supra note 66, § 3.08(1)(b) (defining the CM-at-risk as 
providing advisor service prior to construction, then constructing the project in 
part by using its own forces); see also SWEET, supra note 34, at 385 (“CMs may 
contract on their own with specialty trades, a system that makes them look very 
much like prime contractors.”). 
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employing its own forces—does not manifest assent to the Owner’s 
benefit and control.  Instead, this definition is alarming because it 
utterly destroys any clear distinction between construction 
management and the traditional tripartite system.  Moreover, it 
wholly overlaps the definition of GC/CM.  In fact, much of the 
bewildering confusion addressed here originates from this issue 
seeping its way into form contracts and state law. 
The evolution of construction management may be partially to 
blame.  Prior to 1991, the respective professional organizations for 
architects and general contractors provided their own standard 
contracts for construction management arrangements.104  Forms 
published by the American Institute of Architects (AIA) envisioned 
the CM as an adviser, while forms from the Association of General 
Contractors (AGC) saw the CM as a builder.105  But when AIA 
A121/CMc-AGC Document 565 was jointly issued by the AIA and 
AGC in 1991, it presented a reconciled construction management 
persona.  Under the 2003 revision, the standard contract required 
the CM to perform preconstruction services106 and to set a GMP.107  
It also allowed the CM to commence work using its own forces.108  
This single arrangement has been labeled both as CM-at-risk or 
GC/CM.109
As if that “confused language” was not enough to topple the 
tower, legislatures have indiscriminately adopted both labels.  For 
instance, in Massachusetts, providing preconstruction services 
under a GMP while self-performing work creates a “CM-at-risk,”110 
but in Washington, those same elements create a GC/CM.111  As 
Bruner and O’Connor correctly point out, these self-styled 
distinctions are all just shadings of the traditional tripartite 
system.112  Whether the image of a self-performing CM or a GC who 
provides preconstruction services is preferred, arranging fast-track 
 104. 1 JUSTIN SWEET & JONATHAN J. SWEET, SWEET ON CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY 
CONTRACTS: MAJOR AIA DOCUMENTS § 9.08, at 256 (4th ed. 1999). 
 105. Id. 
 106. AM. INST. OF ARCHITECTS, AIA DOCUMENT A121 CMC / AGC DOCUMENT 565 
§ 2.1 (2003). 
 107. See id. § 2.2. 
 108. See id. § 2.3.2.1. 
 109. Kenig, supra note 3, at 67. 
 110. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 149A, § 2 (West 2007). 
 111. WASH. REV. CODE § 39.10.210(6) (2007). 
 112. 2 BRUNER & O’CONNOR, supra note 20, § 6:13. 
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delivery113 with a GC under a GMP contract accomplishes the same 
result. 
Therefore, these imprecise definitions of CM-at-risk (or 
GC/CM) are misleading.  To set construction management apart, 
an agency bright line must be drawn.  By thinking of CMs in their 
natural function as agents, and realizing layers like GMPs and 
subcontracting are not mutually exclusive of agency relationships, 
resolves confusion over construction management’s application 
and provides Owners a clearer understanding of its advantages. 
Ohio provides an example of this more meaningful agency 
distinction.  Under Ohio law, the CM retains substantial discretion 
and authority in planning, coordinating, and managing the 
construction project, but does not perform any construction 
work.114  The statute facilitates an agency relationship simply by 
removing the CM’s temptation to help itself to an extra portion of 
tax revenue. 
By contrast, Minnesota’s provisions for a CM-at-risk not only 
allow the CM to bid and perform trade work,115 they also allow the 
CM to act as a gatekeeper to the bidding process by deciding who 
can bid and how bids are reviewed.116  This statutory empowerment 
to control the bidding process may encourage CMs to take 
advantage of their competitors.  Moreover, it discourages 
competition.  Few subcontractors will seriously bid work on a 
jobsite already festooned with the competition’s trademarks and 
logos. 
B. Replacing the Master Builder 
Comparing CM statutes—like those in Massachusetts, 
Washington, and Minnesota—illustrates how legislatures have 
overlooked the proper function of construction management.  
Given construction management’s Owner-centric advantages, it 
also illustrates the missed opportunity for states to improve their 
building efficiency, including making design-build a viable public 
contracting option. 
 113. Fast-track delivery begins construction activities before design of the 
project is complete.  See Stover, supra note 66, § 3.01(1)(c). 
 114. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 9.33(A) (West 2004). 
 115. MINN. STAT. § 16C.34 subdiv. 3(e) (2006). 
 116. Id. (allowing the CM-at-risk and commissioner to determine the selection 
criteria and list of qualified firms, provided they do not impose unnecessary 
conditions beyond reasonable requirements). 
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While design-build allows an Owner to allocate substantial risk 
to the builder and eliminates the need to referee feuds between the 
architect and contractor117 (the design-build architect owes its 
contractual duties to the builder),118 it leaves the Owner without a 
skilled representative to look out for its interests.119  Much like the 
GC/CM problem, the builder’s enterprise risk cuts off any 
possibility of a fiduciary relationship between the Owner and the 
builder or the builder’s designer.  Although states like Washington 
and Minnesota find the balance of this trade-off to be beneficial,120 
it reduces their taxpayers’ options in terms of leverage over the 
design-builder.  Instead of a builder or designer bound by 
additional fiduciary duties owed to the government-owner, the 
design-builder can act entirely in its own interests, bound only by 
the terms of the contract and a duty of good faith and fair 
dealing.121
Furthermore, the traditional design-build model is based on 
the unproven premise that self-performed work is more efficient 
than subcontracted work.  In a competitive market, however, the 
traditional design-builder cannot obtain labor or materials any 
cheaper than can a subcontractor.  Consequently, if the CM 
provides the management expertise and risk spreading capability 
traditionally touted by the design-builder, all that remains is buying 
out packages of craftwork and materials.  If the Owner’s desired 
level of performance is readily available in the subcontractor 
 117. See 2 BRUNER & O’CONNOR, supra note 20, § 6:34 (pointing out that 
allowing the Owner to contract solely with one party “gives the owner ‘a single 
point of responsibility’ for design and construction services”).  Design-build 
arrangements are contracted at arm’s length to procure a design and its 
construction from the same source.  Id.  Design-build is a common permutation of 
the traditional tripartite system.  Id. § 6:15.  The Owner seeks to diminish its 
exposure to the construction process by combining the architect and builder.  See 
id. § 6.34.  From a practical standpoint, this eliminates the Owner’s involvement in 
design constructability disputes.  See Mark C. Friedlander, A Primer on Industrial 
Design/Build Construction Contracts, CONSTRUCTION LAW., Apr. 1994, at 3.  From a 
legal standpoint, this provides a single source of liability from which the Owner 
may pursue or defend a claim.  Id. 
 118. See Linda Chiarelli & Lawrence Chiarelli, The Role of the Construction 
Manager on a Design/Build Project, CONSTRUCTION LAW., Apr. 1995, at 58, 61–62. 
 119. 2 BRUNER & O’CONNOR, supra note 20, § 6:15. 
 120. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 39.10.300(1) (Westlaw through 2007 
legislation) (allowing the use of design-build contracts on public works, subject to 
limitations on project type and cost); see also MINN. STAT. § 16C.32 subdiv. 2 (2006) 
(allowing the use of design-build contracts on public works, subject to an 
evaluation of price and design). 
 121. See supra text accompanying note 101. 
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market at a competitive price, (a very real possibility, considering 
the traditional design-builder’s craftwork is competing with other 
similarly situated subcontractors) then the premise of self-
performing efficiency fails.  Thus, state laws that attach a design 
contract to a relationship incapable of both fiduciary responsibility 
and economic efficiency create a losing arrangement for all parties 
involved. 
Alternatively, if a state such as Minnesota adopted a CM-
driven, design-build statute, government builders such as Mn/DOT 
would have a construction expert and fiduciary advisor throughout 
the design and construction process without losing the capability to 
fast-track a project.  Because the CM would assemble the GMP from 
an aggregate of the hard-dollar subcontracts the CM entered into—
and the CM would agree to indemnify the government entity from 
any economic claims arising from design inadequacy122—Minnesota 
could allocate the same risk at competitive prices.  What ultimately 
emerges, then, is similar to a multi-prime contract,123 except the 
CM holds the subcontracts and Minnesota building officials are not 
called on to oversee or administer construction progress.  Thus, in 
a single contract, the CM assumes distributive responsibilities for 
design, management, and risk, while the Owner receives a fiduciary 
representative. 
Admittedly, buying out craftwork in this manner likely loses 
some economies of scale otherwise realized in the traditional 
design-builder’s limited vertical integration.  But as long as the 
Owner or government finds the added cost is less than the benefit 
of a knowledgeable agent dedicated to putting the Owner’s needs 
above its own, and the Owner finds value in spreading risk across a 
greater number of companies, the arrangement is efficient. 
 122. Even in the absence of specific contract language, the CM must 
indemnify the Owner against claims arising from the CM’s own negligence.  See 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.08 cmt. b (2006) (discussing the agent’s duty 
of care to the principal).  Moreover, an agent must act in accordance with the 
express terms of the agency contract.  See id. § 8.07.  And although the Owner has a 
duty to indemnify the CM for acting within the CM’s authority or for the Owner’s 
benefit, see id. § 8.14, this duty can be modified by contract, id. cmt. b.  Thus, the 
contractual overlay of the design-build agreement can customize the 
indemnification scheme between the parties without disposing of the agency 
relationship. 
 123. Under multi-prime contracting, the Owner contracts directly with trade 
contractors to perform work.  See 2 BRUNER & O’CONNOR, supra note 20, § 6:14. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
The construction industry can outline in sixteen divisions each 
material and process used to assemble a building, but when it 
comes to standardizing project delivery, mass confusion ensues.  
Contracting relationships today take many forms; however, these 
are mostly variations on design-bid-build or design-build.  Only the 
construction management approach offers the Owner an agent 
who is also a construction expert.124  By drawing a bright line 
around agency, participants carve out a class of contracts based on 
the unique legal and commercial implications of a master builder 
and agent. 
Further, such a bright line warns those who may otherwise 
stray into the shackles of an unwanted agency relationship.  While 
contract language that systematically denies benefit or control 
running to the Owner militates against an agency relationship, 
such language is not determinative.125  The parties’ actions can just 
as easily impute the agency duties of a principal.126  Thus, clearly 
defining the appropriate use for CM arrangements and its entrance 
criteria helps parties understand what manifestations to avoid if 
agency liability is not desired.  Moreover, it helps judges and 
arbitrators understand the common economic context in which an 
agency relationship might be used, and thus, when the parties’ 
actions are most likely manifestations of such a relationship. 
As a corollary to the bright line, any self-performed work 
disqualifies the CM label.  Consequently, GC/CM clearly cannot 
fall within the CM classification—the agency principles of CM make 
it a jealous sort.  Ideally, a clearer label for GCs providing 
preconstruction and expert builder advice should be used; 
however, the label is so ingrained that quarantining this type of 
arrangement to GC/CM is satisfactory if it means eradicating self-
performance from the CM-at-risk category. 
 124. See SWEET, supra note 34, § 21.04(D).  “Program management,” a close 
cousin of construction management, provides the Owner with an agent that 
analyzes the Owner’s building needs as the Owner contemplates its next capital 
project.  See 2 BRUNER & O’CONNOR, supra note 20, § 6:11.  While this model is 
practically identical to CM, it focuses more on advising the Owner what to build, 
not how to build it.  Id.  Thus, it was not considered in this construction delivery 
discussion. 
 125. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.02. 
 126. Id. § 1.03 (“A person manifests assent or intention through written or 
spoken words or other conduct.”).  This manifestation can be any conduct “by a 
person, observable by others, that expresses meaning.”  Id. cmt. b. 
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Although construction management has been around for forty 
years, it still accounts for only a fraction of the building industry.127  
While many factors may account for its failure to catch on, high 
transaction costs and a resulting perception of inefficiency are the 
likely culprits.  Drawing the agency bright line proposed here is a 
step toward reducing this friction and providing Owners and the 
industry with a workable delivery system. 
 
 127. In 2005, the combined CM-for-fee and CM-at-risk revenue from the top 
firm in each category was $7.4 billion.  See Tulacz, supra note 71, at 41, 43.  By 
comparison, the single largest contractor’s non-CM receipts in the U.S. were in 
excess of $14 billion.  Id.; see also Tulacz, supra note 21, at 60.  But see Spangler & 
Hill, supra note 71, at 30 (contending that construction management has become 
a preferred delivery method over the years). 
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